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IF THERE’S A WILL, THERE’S A WAY: THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT’S SIDESTEP OF 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 




I.   INTRODUCTION 
Following the ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the California 
Supreme Court held in Sonic-Calabasas A., Inc. v Moreno (“Sonic II”) that an arbitration 
agreement containing the waiver of a Berman
1
 hearing in an adhesive employment 
contract signed as a condition of employment was not per se unconscionable.
2
  However, 
the court narrowed the ruling of AT&T Mobility and held that unconscionability was still 
a relevant defense to the enforcement of arbitration clauses.
3
  To do this, the court 
distinguished generally applicable state laws that did not undermine fundamental 
attributes of arbitration and those that did, and found that adhesive arbitration agreements 
that required the waiver of a Berman hearing had to provide for an available, reasonable 
determination of wage disputes.
4
  The holding leaves adhesive arbitration agreements in 
employment contracts open to inquiries by the courts as to their enforceability in contexts 
outside Berman hearing waivers.  Practitioners in California would be wise to tailor their 
adhesive employment arbitration agreements to align with the procedures provided in 
Berman hearings as closely as possible, lest the agreements be found unconscionable.  
While this case initially seems like acquiescence by the California Supreme Court to the 
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1
 The following is a summary of a Berman hearing:  
“The Berman hearing procedure is designed to provide a speedy, informal, and 
affordable method of resolving wage claims. In brief, in a Berman proceeding 
the commissioner may hold a hearing on the wage claim; the pleadings are 
limited to a complaint and an answer; the answer may set forth the evidence that 
the defendant intends to rely on, and there is no discovery process; if the 
defendant fails to appear or answer no default is taken and the commissioner 
proceeds to decide the claim, but may grant a new hearing on request. The 
commissioner must decide the claim within 15 days after the hearing. Within 10 
days after notice of the decision any party may appeal to the appropriate court, 
where the claim will be heard de novo; if no appeal is taken, the commissioner's 
decision will be deemed a judgment, final immediately and enforceable as a 
judgment in a civil action.”  
Cuadra v Millan, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1998). 
2
 Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 188 (Cal. 2013) [hereinafter Sonic II].   
3





United States Supreme Court’s ruling in AT&T Mobility v Concepcion,5 the California 
Supreme Court again refused to accept defeat with regards to unconscionability.   
II.   BACKGROUND FACTS 
Frank Moreno, an employee of Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. (“Sonic”), was required 
to sign, as a condition of his employment, among other things, an agreement
6
 to arbitrate 
employment disputes.
7
  In December 2006, Mr. Moreno left his job with Sonic and began 
the first step in obtaining a Berman hearing by filing an administrative wage claim in 
California with the Labor Commissioner, claiming he was owed unpaid vacation wages.
8
  
In February 2007, arguing that Mr. Moreno had waived his right to a Berman 
hearing in the arbitration agreement, Sonic “petitioned the superior court to compel 
arbitration of the wage claim and to dismiss the pending [Berman hearing].”9  The 
Superior Court denied the motion, reasoning that arbitration could not be compelled until 
                                                 
5
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
6
 Id. at 188-89.  The important aspects of the arbitration agreement are copied below.   
“The agreement also contained a paragraph governing dispute resolution, which 
required both parties to submit employment disputes to “binding arbitration 
under the Federal Arbitration Act, in conformity with the procedures of the 
California Arbitration Act (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 1280 et seq…).” The 
arbitration provision applied to “all disputes that may arise out of the 
employment context … that either [party] may have against the other which 
would otherwise require or allow resort to any court or other governmental 
dispute resolution forum[,]… whether based on tort, contract, statutory, or 
equitable law, or otherwise.” The provision specified that it did not apply to 
claims brought under the National Labor Relations Act or the California 
Workers’ Compensation Act, or to claims before the Employment Development 
Department. The provision further stated that the employee was not prevented 
from “filing and pursuing administrative proceedings only before the California 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing or the U.S. Equal Opportunity 
Commission.” In addition, the agreement provided that arbitration is to be 
conducted by a “retired California Superior Court Judge” and that “to the extent 
applicable in civil actions in California courts, the following shall apply and be 
observed: all rules of pleading (including the right of demurrer), all rules of 
evidence, all rights to resolution of the dispute by means of motions for 
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and judgment under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 631.8.” At the request of either party, an arbitration 
award may be reviewed by a second arbitrator who will, ‘as far as practicable, 
proceed according to the law and procedures applicable to appellate review by 
the California Court of Appeal of a civil judgment following court trial.’” 
7
 Id. at 188. 
8
 Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 188.  Moreno claimed he was owed sixty-three days of unpaid vacation wages, 





after a hearing and decision by the Labor Commissioner.
10
  The Court of Appeals held 
that the arbitration agreement was a proper waiver of a Berman hearing and that it was 
not against public policy.
11
   
The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeals and held in 
Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc., v Moreno (“Sonic I”) that the waiver of a Berman hearing in a 




  The 
Court held that such a waiver was against public policy because the protections given by 
the Berman hearing were public and could not be waived by a private contract.
14
  The 
Court also held that such a waiver was unconscionable because, as an adhesive contract, 
it was predicated upon acceptance in order to gain employment, making it procedurally 
unconscionable.
15
  Further, the Court held the waiver only favored the employer, making 
it substantively unconscionable.
16
  The Court, however, did not invalidate the arbitration 
agreement; instead, it simply severed the Berman waiver.  After the Berman hearing 
concluded, the parties were free to arbitrate.
17
  The Court found that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”)18 did not preempt this holding because the state law rule against 
a Berman hearing waiver did not discriminate against arbitration agreements generally; 
the rule applied to non-arbitration contracts also.
19
 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Sonic I, and in light 
of the holding in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
20
 vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case for reconsideration to the California Supreme Court.
21
 The Supreme 
Court held in AT&T Mobility that a class action waiver within a consumer arbitration 
agreement was not unconscionable.
22
  The Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a 
                                                 
10




 Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 51 Cal.4th 659, 684 (Cal. 2011) [hereinafter Sonic I].  
13
 Id. at 686. 
14
 Id. at 679. 
15




 Sonic I, 51 Cal.4th at 676. 
18
 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013). 
19
 Id. at 689. 
20
 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1740. 
21
 Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 132 S.Ct. 496 (2011). 
22
 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1753.  
 352 
 
California state law that made class action waivers unconscionable because it went 
against the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitration.
23
  The holding in the current 
case represents the California Supreme Court’s reconsideration of the issue in light of 
AT&T Mobility, on remand from the Supreme Court. 
III. COURT REASONING 
A. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 
In Sonic II, the California Supreme Court overruled their holding in Sonic I and 
held that the FAA, as interpreted in AT&T Mobility, preempted their Sonic I ruling that 
waiver of a Berman hearing was per se unconscionable.
24
  To understand this fully, it is 
important to summarize the holding in AT&T Mobility briefly, as applicable to this case.  
In AT&T Mobility, the Concepcions agreed to an adhesive arbitration agreement, which 
contained a class action waiver, with AT&T.
25
  They later had a dispute with AT&T and 
attempted to bring a class action suit against AT&T.
26
  Lower courts relied on the 
Discover Bank rule
27
 to invalidate the class action waiver contained in the arbitration 
agreement.
28
 The Supreme Court held that “courts cannot impose unconscionability rules 
that interfere with arbitral efficiency, including rules forbidding waiver of administrative 
procedures that delay arbitration.”29  The Court held that “[w]hen state law prohibits 
outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The 
conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”30  Stated more broadly, the Supreme Court 
held that per se rules of unconscionability are preempted by the FAA.
31
  The FAA 




 Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 198. 
25
 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1744.   
26
 Id.  
27
 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 87 (Cal. 2005). In Discover Bank, the 
California Supreme Court held that consumer arbitration class action waivers are unconscionable if the 
arbitration agreement is adhesive in nature, the weaker party alleges the stronger party is intentionally 
trying to defraud the weaker party, and disputes are likely to be small dollar amounts.   
28
 A&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1745. 
29
 Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 199 (summarizing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1749).  
30





preempts a state’s rule that is “inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for 
unrelated reasons.”32   
B. The California Supreme Court’s Application of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 
on Remand 
The California Supreme Court, prompted by the holding in AT&T Mobility, found 
that a per se rule prohibiting waiver of Berman hearings was preempted by the FAA: 
“[b]ecause a Berman hearing causes arbitration to be substantially delayed, the 
unwaivability of such a hearing, even if desirable as a matter of contractual fairness or 
public policy, interferes with a fundamental attribute of arbitration—namely, its objective 
to achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.”33  The Court held that 
requiring a Berman hearing before commencement of arbitration would go against one of 
the fundamental attributes of arbitration: to achieve quick results.
34
   
Although the FAA preempted California’s law categorically prohibiting waiver of 
a Berman hearing,
35
  the California Supreme Court found that unconscionability was still 
a viable defense after AT&T Mobility.
36
  According to the Court, the ruling in AT&T 
Mobility let stand the savings clause in FAA Section 2.  The savings clause states 
arbitration agreements are to be unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”37  These grounds include “generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”38   
The Court then narrowed the holding of AT&T Mobility, stating that it only 
limited unconscionability; the holding did not abolish it as an available defense.
39
  The 
Court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s reasoning that some state-law rules are 
preempted by the FAA not only if they discriminate against arbitration on their face, but, 
when facially neutral state-laws are applied, they interfere with fundamental attributes of 
arbitration.
40
  However, the court used this idea to justify the idea that “state-law rules 
that do not interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration do not implicate 










 Id. at 201. 
37
 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
38
 Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 201 (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1746). 
39
 Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 201. 
40
 Id. at 203. 
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Concepcion’s limits on state unconscionability rules.”41  The Court’s argument was that 
unconscionability does not always interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration, 
and if it does not, it would be allowed.
42
 
The Court used this reasoning to find that a Berman hearing waiver could still be 
unconscionable.
43
  The Court stated that “[w]aiver of [Berman hearing] protections does 
not necessarily render an arbitration agreement unenforceable…but waiver of these 
protections in the context of an agreement that does not provide an employee with an 
accessible and affordable arbitral forum for resolving wage disputes may support a 
finding of unconscionability.”44  The rule set by the Court “simply requires an adhesive 
arbitration agreement that compels the surrender of Berman protections as a condition of 
employment to provide for accessible, affordable resolution of wage disputes.”45  The 
rule set forth by the Court was a state-law rule that did not undermine fundamental 
attributes of arbitration, allowing it to survive the holding of AT&T Mobility.
46
 
C. How Courts are to Determine Unconscionability 
The California Supreme Court explained that courts must look to the terms of the 
agreement and the process in practice to determine unconscionability.
47
  If, on the whole, 
the arbitration agreement provided for an affordable, effective means of resolving wage 
disputes, the agreement would not be found unconscionable.
48
  If the agreement made it 
difficult or expensive for an employee to resolve a wage dispute, then the agreement 
would be found unconscionable.
49
  The Court noted that there were some things that went 
against the arbitration agreement in the current case, such as the trial like process the 
arbitration agreement created: the arbitration was to be run by a retired California 
Superior Court Judge, inclusion of discovery, depositions, application of the rules of 
evidence, and review of the arbitration award.
50
  While the arbitration agreement did 
                                                 
41
 Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 201 (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1748). 
42






 Id. at 206. 
46
 Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 206.   
47









contain these features that were not tailored toward quick and affordable resolution of 
wage claims, the Court found it necessary for courts to look to the arbitral institution 
rules agreed to and the actual process undertaken to determine if those features promoted 
fundamental attributes of arbitration.
51
  The Court acknowledged that there was no one 
way to administer a wage dispute, and that arbitration could achieve the goals of a 
Berman hearing.
52
  The Court also found that the way the contract was formed would be 
important to the unconscionability question, such as whether the Berman waiver was 
freely negotiated by a party with similar bargaining power.
53
   
In the end, the Court laid out guidance for lower courts to determine 
unconscionability in an adhesive employment contract that contained a Berman waiver, 
but did not resolve the inquiry in the current case.
54
  It remanded this to the lower court to 
determine, given the totality of the circumstances set out in the opinion, whether the 




Sonic II is significant because it is an acceptance, albeit mandatory, by the 
California Supreme Court of the holding in AT&T Mobility.  It does, however, contain an 
important caveat.  The California Supreme Court accepted that their previous ruling, that 
Berman hearing waiver was per se unconscionable, was untenable, but they nevertheless 
went to great lengths to narrow the holding in AT&T Mobility.  The California Supreme 
Court refused to give into the Supreme Court, and the holding in Sonic II could bring a 
challenge by that judicial body.  This holding once again shows the California judiciary’s 
hostility to arbitration.
56
    
While this case only dealt with the waiver of a Berman hearing, a broad reading 
of the holding, that state-law rules that do not undermine fundamental attributes of 
arbitration are acceptable, could open Pandora’s box.  This holding potentially allows 
disaffected parties to bring unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements that 
waive other state-law rules that promote speed and affordability.  Parties who want to 
                                                 
51




 Id. at 204-05. 
54
 Id. at 205. 
55
 Id. at 203. 
56
 See McLaughlin on Class Actions §2.14. Limitations on applicability of class action device – Class 
certification in arbitration – Enforceability of consumer contract provisions barring class actions.  Courts 
applying California law were conspicuously hostile to "no class action" clauses in arbitration agreements, 
reasoning that in actions involving small sums such clauses can be exculpatory in practice.  See also Alan 
S. Kaplinsky, Business Lawyer, Arbitration Developments: Concepcion – The Supreme Court Decisively 
Steps In. In the wake of Conception, both state and federal courts have enforced arbitration agreements 
containing class action waivers, even in states previously hostile to arbitration such as California. 
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delay arbitration would be able to litigate such claims in court, which in the end would 
neither promote speed nor affordability, as the litigation would take more time and more 
money. 
Practitioners who represent employers that impose adhesive arbitration 
agreements on their employees as a condition of employment in California should pay 
close attention to how this case is handled on remand and to any subsequent proceedings.  
In the interim, practitioners should tailor their arbitration agreements to this ruling to 
defeat any unconscionability suits.  In Sonic I, the waiver of a Berman hearing was found 
to be unconscionable, which if it had prevailed, would have meant that the parties would 
have gone through a Berman hearing before they could arbitrate.  Therefore, practitioners 
should look to the California Supreme Court’s analysis on how to determine 
unconscionability to avoid that outcome. 
The Court’s analysis focused on a few key factors to determine unconscionability. 
To avoid a court finding waiver of a Berman hearing as unconscionable based on one’s 
arbitration agreement, practitioners should first and foremost provide for a forum that 
promotes speed and affordability.
57
  While there is no one way to do this, as the Court 
points out,
58
 practitioners would be wise to provide protections similar to Berman 
hearings.
59
  This includes implementing a system to pay for attorney’s fees because 
Berman hearings call for employers to pay their employees’ attorney’s fees on appeal if 
the employee wins more than zero dollars.
60
  Practitioners could adopt this rule, which 
would go towards promoting the affordability of the arbitration process.  If a practitioner 
is worried about excessive fees, the practitioner can give the arbitrator the power to 
determine reasonable attorney’s fees.  The employer should also agree to pay the 
arbitrator costs and administrative fees, making access to resolution of a wage dispute 
even more affordable.  Practitioners must not be penny wise and pound foolish, as the 
ability to avoid class arbitration still makes arbitration more valuable in the long run. 
 Practitioners might also look into promoting document-only arbitration with 
regards to wage disputes.  Document-only arbitration is a quick and affordable process in 
which the parties submit documents and do not conduct oral hearings.
61
  Document-only 
arbitration would allow for a quick and affordable disposition of the wage dispute. The 
process is quick because parties need only send in documents supporting their position, 
                                                 
57
 Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 203. 
58




 Id. at 191-92. 
61
 Document-only proceedings are offered by one of the more well-known arbitration institutions, 







with no need for drawn out judicial processes, like discovery or cross-examination.
62
  
Document-only arbitration is also affordable because the fees are smaller and it does not 
necessarily require an attorney; if it does, the attorney’s involvement is muted compared 
to the typical trial or arbitration proceedings, therefore their fees are lessened.
63
  If 
practitioners can integrate document-only arbitration into their arbitration agreements, it 
has the ability to not only save them from an unconscionability defense, but also to save 
money and time. 
 The ruling in Sonic II creates jurisdictional variability.  The holding sanctions a 
case-by-case assessment of arbitration agreements.  It has the potential to create a way 
out of arbitration for disgruntled employees, and hope that they get a judge who will 
liberally apply unconscionability review.  One easy fix to this problem would be the 
inclusion of a delegation of jurisdictional authority (Kaplan clause) within the arbitration 
agreement.  In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v Kaplan, the Supreme Court ruled that if 
the parties agreed to submit jurisdictional issues to the arbitrator, then the arbitrator had 
the authority to rule on them.
64
  This would give arbitrators the power to rule on the 
arbitrability of the issues, such as unconscionability, themselves.
65
  The successful 
insertion of a Kaplan clause into the arbitration agreement would take the analysis of the 
court on the unconscionability of the waiver of a state-law rule out of the court’s hands 
and place it in the hands of the arbitrator.
66
  This case theoretically could have been 
avoided if there had been a Kaplan clause included in the arbitration agreement.  
V.   CRITIQUE 
The Court’s overruling of the holding in Sonic I was inevitable considering the 
Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility, but the Court’s determination that 
unconscionability remained viable is cause for concern within the arbitration community.  
The biggest consequence of the holding is that the Court increased the ability of the 
judiciary to supervise arbitration agreements.  This increased judicial supervision can be 
seen as a good or bad thing depending on the party.  We will look at the ruling in Sonic II 
from the perspective of both an employer and an employee. 
The ruling in Sonic II is bad for employers who have Berman waivers within their 
arbitration agreements because it creates uncertainty with regards to their arbitration 




 Id. The total cost of the AAA’s document-only proceeding is $1,300. 
64
 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 941-42 (1995). 
65
 See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010). 
66
 Here is the successful delegation of jurisdictional authority from Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2777:  
 “[t]he Arbitrator…shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to 
 the...enforceability...of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part 
 of this Agreement is void or voidable.” 
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agreements.  It is impossible for employers to know if the arbitration agreement they 
draft today is going to be enforceable down the road.  This uncertainty increases the costs 
of arbitration.  A court ruling that a Berman hearing waiver is unconscionable leads to 
longer resolutions of wage disputes because parties need to go through a Berman hearing 
before getting to arbitration.  This makes arbitration less attractive to employers than it 
previously would have been because it allows employees two bites at the apple.  If the 
employee does not get what they want from the Berman hearing, they have the recourse 
to arbitration, drawing out the final resolution of the dispute in question.  Because 
employers will not know if their arbitration agreement is unconscionable, they cannot 
effectively plan for future litigation costs.  Instead of going to arbitration with their 
disputes, the employer may have to endure litigation on the unconscionability of the 
Berman hearing waiver, and if it is inadequate, proceed through a Berman hearing, then 
potentially go to arbitration.  The employer had hoped to go through one process, 
arbitration; instead it potentially goes through three different judicial processes, all to 
settle a wage claim.   
On the other side of the equation is the employee.  The Sonic II holding favors 
employees because it tips the scales of the adhesive contract.  The employer wrote the 
arbitration agreement, and as a self-interested party, they will more likely than not tailor 
it toward their needs and not an employees.  The employer already has the ability to 
impose terms favorable to themselves, such as class action waiver; the court is just giving 
the employee some protection.  States argue that they should be able to regulate this, 
within their police powers, as a way to protect employees and grant them basic 
protections.  By ruling that state-law rules can pass unconscionability muster as long as 
they do not interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration, allows states to regulate 
arbitration without being preempted.  This holding forces employers to write arbitration 
agreements in a way that is less one-sided.  Agreements will need to be written in a way 
that lines up with the expectations of the employee: that if wronged, the employee will 
have state sanctioned recourse available. 
The holding in Sonic II runs contrary to the emphatic federal policy favoring 
arbitration.  While those wishing to compel arbitration do not normally need to prove to 
the court that the arbitration agreed to is equal to the recourse to litigation, they are forced 
to prove that arbitration is just as quick and affordable as a Berman hearing.  The holding 
in Sonic II allows courts to postpone arbitration agreements in favor of state-law rules.  It 
also runs counter to the idea of freedom of contract.  The parties agreed to waiver of 
Berman hearings and the Court has decided it knows better than the parties and will not 
allow it.  The Court points to unconscionability as the reason, but the Court’s analysis is 
not whether the arbitration proceeding itself is unconscionable, but whether the 
arbitration process is comparable to a Berman hearing.  This is classic judicial hostility to 
arbitration.  If a contract had provided for a Berman hearing waiver, and provided for the 
parties to go to court, the California Supreme Court would not have called that agreement 
unconscionable.  However, because arbitration is involved, an employer has to prove that 
his process is up to the courts’ liking.  This is the type of judicial hostility the Supreme 
Court has fought against, and which they ultimately might take up in the future. 
 
